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Shaking the Foundations of the Law:
Some Legal Issues Posed by a Detection
of Extra-Terrestrial Life
Frans G. von der Dunk
18.1 Law and Ethics—Law as a Social Construct
In order to properly address the legal issues posed by a proper detection of
extra-terrestrial life (not just a mere serious possibility, as with the recent discovery
of actual water on Mars), because of its extraordinary character it is necessary to
briefly revisit the foundations of ‘the law’ as a social construct, and explore its
relationship to ‘ethics’ as another social construct.
The type of ‘law’ being discussed here is, of course, man-made, and made to deal
with human activities, including human reactions to (other) events. Human-made
law has for example been defined as “the principles and regulations established in a
community by some authority and applicable to its people, whether in the form of
legislation or of custom and policies recognized and enforced by judicial decision”.1
Further to such a general definition, human-made law is, essentially, meant to
achieve two, sometimes cooperating, sometimes contradicting aims.
Asmost people would readily acknowledge, law is first supposed to establish some
semblance of justice. What ‘justice’ is, is at least partially subjective and culturally
determined, and moreover shifting over time. In order to properly adapt thereto, law
also has its own inherent system for change—procedures for creating new treaties
overriding old ones at the international level, procedures for creating new legislation
overriding old legislation on the national level by parliamentary (or other) procedures.
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As a consequence, law presents a formalized and somewhat inflexible social
construct as compared to, for example, social pressure, morals or, indeed, ethics
(which has been defined for instance as “a system of moral principles”2). Law
therefore usually tends to lag behind ethics; the more flexible and fluid character of
the latter guarantees that the more formal process for changing the former takes
more time, sometimes considerably so. Only if the paradigm changes in a certain
area of morals or ethics are so fundamental in nature (and usually also within such a
short timeframe) that the formalized procedures for changing the law are seen as
part of the problem of the substantive law which is supposed to change radically
instead of part of the solution, allowing for due adaptation of substantive law, will
such procedures be ignored. This is essentially what we call ‘revolution’.3
This is also why at a certain point in time the ethics with respect to a certain
subject matter may not be completely commensurate with the law on such subject
matter: the latter may not yet have caught up sufficiently—or there might be certain
ethical principles which are too broad and too vague to give shape to meaningful
legal requirements and obligations. As a consequence, whether a certain action or
activity is ‘ethical’ or not only plays an indirect role in determination of its law-
fulness: unless the law has fully and explicitly incorporated the ethical principle(s)
at issue, the latter would serve not as a legal rule in itself but mainly as a guiding
principle for helping interpret certain legal rules or principles. Oftentimes, thus,
courts are encouraged to use such ethical principles as ‘equity’ or ‘ex aequo et
bono’ in applying the law. Still, the result may well be that at a given moment in
time the law, or its implementation, within a given community does not always
(completely) reflect the ethics of that community.
This is however where the second major role of the law comes in: it is also
supposed to establish some efficiency in human interaction, to allow some measure
of predictability of human action, thereby easing human interaction. This pre-
dictability is the root cause also of the inherent inflexibility noted; it usually pre-
cludes law from being changed on a whim, at the instigation of a single event or
string of events without much thorough reflection and consideration. As a matter of
fact, most law is developed more for this purpose than for achieving ‘justice’—
there is for example no inherent justice in driving left or right. This is also relevant
for outer space, where there is not even a ‘left’ or ‘right’.
A final key feature of the law as a consequence of its being man-made is that is
essentially follows man: only when and where humans become active, might law
become necessary—and do humans go through the trouble of developing it. In the
international community, such an elaborate national legal order is fundamentally
2As per http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/ethics?s=t.
3Thus, ‘revolution’ has been defined as “an overthrow or repudiation and the thorough replace-
ment of an established government or political system by the people governed”, alternatively “a
radical and pervasive change in society and the social structure, especially one made suddenly and
often accompanied by violence”; as per http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/revolution?s=t.
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based on state sovereignty over national territory: states are the legal ‘constructs’ of
groups of humans through which public international law is developed and
applied.4
18.2 Spanning the Globe: The Domain
of International Law
Equally based on state sovereignty, on an international level law is fundamentally
and foremost developed essentially between states, in the absence of any global
legislative authority. Even the United Nations, often seen as the closest thing in the
international community to a ‘world government’, can only in very exceptional
circumstances impose its legal will upon unwilling states—namely if such a state
has committed acts of aggression against other sovereign states or committed other
very serious international crimes, and even then only if and to the extent that at least
all five major powers holding the right of veto in the UN Security Council, agree.5
The most visible element of inter-state created international law consists of
international treaties,6 where states agree on draft texts ready for adoption, and then
—on an individual basis—decide to adhere to or not, sometimes with individual
conditions attached which further complicate the resulting legal situation. They can
thus essentially determine which international obligations they are willing to accept
in return for other states accepting the same obligations on a reciprocal basis.
In the present context, it could at least in theory be imagined that states would
conclude treaties amongst themselves about joint approaches to the possibilities of
finding extra-terrestrial life. However, states would presumably only go through
such ‘trouble’ if an actual and urgent matter arises in this context—read: a major
discovery of actual extra-terrestrial life, possibly intelligent, calling for immediate
action—or in case of joint outer space projects searching for such life—in view of
the presumably immense costs and technological capabilities this would require.
The second element, usually coming into play where treaties do not apply, or
where their application is insufficiently clear, uniform and/or generally acceptable,
is customary international law.7 Customary international law in the last resort is
4See already Art. 2(1), UN Charter (Charter of the United Nations, San Francisco, done 26 June
1945, entered into force 24 October 1945; USTS 993; 24 UST 2225; 59 Stat. 1031; 145 UKTS
805; UKTS 1946 No. 67; Cmd. 6666 & 6711; CTS 1945 No. 7; ATS 1945 No. 1), which posits
territorial sovereignty of states as perhaps the most fundamental tenet of the international legal
order—even to this day.
5See Arts. 39, 41 & 42, UN Charter. The five states referred to are the United States, the Russian
Federation, the United Kingdom, France and China.
6Cf. Art. 38(1)(a), ICJ Statute (Statute of the International Court of Justice, San Francisco, done 26
June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945; 156 UNTS 77; USTS 993; 59 Stat. 1031; UKTS
1946 No. 67; ATS 1945 No. 1).
7Cf. Art. 38(1)(b), ICJ Statute.
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about state behaviour and attendant state conviction that such behaviour is of a
legally binding nature—as effectively interpreted by authoritative legal experts; if
these generally speaking are not in agreement, most likely a case for the existence
of relevant customary international obligations can not be made.
In the present context, it would be difficult to pinpoint any halfway realistic
scenario whereby states, through their behaviour in a consistent manner vis-à-vis
(the possibility of existence of) extra-terrestrial life and attendant convictions,
establish a relevant rule of customary international law in terms of what types of
actions they might be expected or even required to undertake, although it can of
course not be completely excluded. One main element in customary international
law is precisely the customary part; meaning usually a number of similar situations
need to be analysed before anyone could come to the conclusion that a rule of
customary international law has arisen in that context. So far, of course, we have
encountered a bit of evidence only of the likelihood of particular extra-terrestrial
life, and state action would most likely not anytime soon rise to the level of a
consistent ‘(state) practice’ from which legal convictions could be derived.
A final point concerns the concepts of ‘subjects’ and ‘objects’ of the law. The
former term refers to those who are formally entitled to rights under a legal system
and to defend themselves against interference with those rights. In terms for
example of contract law and national law this concerns inter alia natural persons,
with the exception of children and other persons considered mentally incapable.
Like animals, they have certain rights, but are unable to defend themselves under
the law. The latter term, of ‘objects of the law’, refers precisely to those latter
categories.
In international law, however, traditionally only states qualified as subjects of the
law. Increasingly it may also apply to intergovernmental organizations, private
entities and individuals, but that is still exceptional and limited to certain domains
only. For example, individual humans have been given certain independent
standing in the field of human rights law, being allowed themselves to protect their
interests in appropriate international courts and tribunals. In all other respects,
however, intergovernmental organizations, private entities and individuals still
remain mere objects of the law—the ‘animals’ and ‘children’ of international law.
18.3 Going Extra-Terrestrial: The Special Role
of Space Law
Within the above context of general public international law, space law refers to a
specific sub-set of legal rules applicable to outer space and human activities therein.
Consequently it developed basically following the launch of Sputnik in 1957, as a
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relatively novel area of law.8 The 1967 Outer Space Treaty9 functions as the
overarching document in this context, providing the general legal framework for all
human activities in outer space, for the benefit of all mankind and for peaceful
purposes.10
Further major principles include the responsibility and liability of states also for
private activities in outer space, meaning that if, for example, in the course of the
search for extra-terrestrial life, private associations or organizations violate appli-
cable rules of international law or cause damage to other humans and their activ-
ities, whether on earth or in outer space, their states are to be held accountable at the
international level.11 Consequently, states increasingly develop national (space)
laws including systems of licensing and authorization in order to take care of such
accountability.12
Also with regard to intergovernmental organizations, while they are referenced
in the treaty as major players in the space arena, ultimately the member states bear
international responsibility and liability for any space activities conducted within
their frameworks.13 Consequently, states here would do well to—and usually
indeed did—provide for an internal system to ensure that the organization would
not undertake any activities which could thus entail their own responsibilities or
liabilities.
States are furthermore to respect the freedom of exploration and use of outer
space, inter alia targeting scientific exploration,14 and respect other legitimate space
activities by consulting with others if their own activities may result in harmful
interference with those of others as well as accept requests for consultation by such
others.15
Finally, Article III of the Outer Space Treaty ensures that wherever the treaty
itself or other special rules of space law are not sufficiently clear or even absent,
general public international law—notably the UN Charter, which is expressly
8Thus, the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) was established in
1958/1959 to discuss legal issues resulting from outer space activities and come forward with
proposals for developing relevant law at the international level.
9Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty),
London/Moscow/Washington, done 27 January 1967, entered into force 10 October 1967; 610
UNTS 205; TIAS 6347; 18 UST 2410; UKTS 1968 No. 10; Cmnd. 3198; ATS 1967 No. 24; 6
ILM 386 (1967).
10See in particular Arts. I-IV, Outer Space Treaty.
11Cf. Arts. VI, VII, Outer Space Treaty.
12Major examples thereof concern the United States, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, the United
Kingdom and France, but also smaller states such as South Korea, Sweden, Belgium, the
Netherlands and Austria.
13Cf. Arts. VI, XIII, Outer Space Treaty.
14See Art. I, Outer Space Treaty.
15See Art. IX, Outer Space Treaty.
18 Shaking the Foundations of the Law: Some Legal Issues … 255
fvonderdunk2@unl.edu
mentioned in view of its key role in the context of international peace and security
—can be used to delineate the relevant legal situation, rules, rights and obligations.
Further to the Outer Space Treaty itself, a few other treaties have been developed
to elaborate on specific aspects of the former. Notably this concerns the 1968
Rescue Agreement,16 the 1972 Liability Convention17 and the 1975 Registration
Convention.18
Effectively, the scope of the legal regime thus established (even if only in
embryonic fashion) extends as far as human activities extend into outer space—the
Outer Space Treaty itself in this respect as per most of its relevant Articles refers to
“outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies”.19 Informally, how-
ever, this clause is accepted by most experts as being limited to our solar system—
likely and/or mainly because so far only very few man-made artefacts have left that
solar system.
Another set of international rules, generally relevant for space activities yet
usually distinguished as a separate regime, is that of telecommunications law, a
sub-set of legal rules applicable to the international (effects of) use of
radio-frequencies and, in the case of satellites, attendant orbital slots or orbits.
A key role here is played by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU),
which started to address satellite communications also shortly following the launch
of Sputnik in 1957.
The ITU, on the basis of the ITU Constitution,20 the ITU Convention21 and the
Radio Regulations22 as overarching documents, most importantly takes care of the
coordination of all international usage of radio frequencies.23 This includes
16Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects
Launched into Outer Space (Rescue Agreement), London/Moscow/Washington, done 22 April
1968, entered into force 3 December 1968; 672 UNTS 119; TIAS 6599; 19 UST 7570; UKTS
1969 No. 56; Cmnd. 3786; ATS 1986 No. 8; 7 ILM 151 (1968).
17Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (Liability
Convention), London/Moscow/Washington, done 29 March 1972, entered into force 1 September
1972; 961 UNTS 187; TIAS 7762; 24 UST 2389; UKTS 1974 No. 16; Cmnd. 5068; ATS 1975
No. 5; 10 ILM 965 (1971).
18Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (Registration Convention),
New York, done 14 January 1975, entered into force 15 September 1976; 1023 UNTS 15; TIAS
8480; 28 UST 695; UKTS 1978 No. 70; Cmnd. 6256; ATS 1986 No. 5; 14 ILM 43 (1975).
19Cf. e.g. Arts. I, II, III, Outer Space Treaty.
20Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU Constitution), Geneva, done 22
December 1992, entered into force 1 July 1994; 1825 UNTS 1; UKTS 1996 No. 24; Cm. 2539;
ATS 1994 No. 28; Final Acts of the Additional Plenipotentiary Conference, Geneva, 1992 (1993),
at 1.
21Convention of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU Convention), Geneva, done 22
December 1992, entered into force 1 July 1994; 1825 UNTS 1; UKTS 1996 No. 24; Cm. 2539;
ATS 1994 No. 28; Final Acts of the Additional Plenipotentiary Conference, Geneva, 1992 (1993),
at 71.
22Cf. Arts. 4(3), 6, ITU Constitution.
23See Arts. 1(2), 44, ITU Convention; Art. 7, ITU Convention.
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listening to signals from and transmitting messages to extra-terrestrial life. Such
coordination aims at the avoidance of (international) interference through a com-
plicated system of allocation of frequency bands to categories of services and
allotment of frequencies to certain systems. The activity of ‘listening’ to radio
waves coming to earth from deep space—also known as ‘radio astronomy’—has
become recognized as one of those services, so as to enjoy interference-free ‘use’ of
certain frequency bands duly allocated to it.24
18.4 Law and (the Search for) Extra-Terrestrial Life
Moving finally to the issue of ‘law’ vis-à-vis extra-terrestrial life, the first thing to
note is that ‘law’ as such, including space law, does not address any
extra-terrestrials. It is intended, as indicated, for actions of and/or interaction
between humans, or at least their legal creations such as companies, associations
and states.
This then also includes all kinds of human activities in the context of the search
for extra-terrestrial life—not necessarily, however, as we shall see, extra-terrestrial
life itself. Such activities, in theory, could be undertaken at three levels: private (that
is, private associations and organizations, university and other research institutes—
as least as long as not government-run—and individual persons), national-public
(meaning governmental organizations, notably space agencies) and public inter-
national (meaning inter-state organizations, whether the European Space Agency
(ESA) on behalf of its member states, or the United Nations on behalf of the world
community). Legally-technically speaking, all three result in the responsibility and
liability of one or more states, which would consequently presumably wish to have
some level of control over such activities, even if they might condone them as such.
It is certainly too early to even consider establishing prohibitions at the inter-
national level to conduct such searches and efforts to establish contact by individual
private organizations, certainly as long as condoned by the respective states
internationally accountable for them, let alone search activities conducted by
individual states. The sovereignty of states at the international level here translates
into a fundamental freedom of inter alia action, expression and opinion for each
such state,25 unfettered by any international authority dictating and controlling such
efforts or messages.
At the same time, of course, there would be an inherent logic in involving only a
single channel for, or at least coordinate at a single level, substantial human activity
in the search for extra-terrestrial life, in particular if intelligent—and even more in
24Cf. Art. 1.13, 1.58, Radio Regulations.
25While the sovereignty of states as perhaps the most fundamental structural rule of international
law is reflected in many legal documents (including e.g. the aforementioned Art. 2(1)1, UN
Charter), e.g. Art. 2(4), UN Charter, specifically protects political independence of any state
against any forceful interference by another state.
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particular if requiring either immediate action or otherwise large investments and a
large technological know-how. Such efforts would then most likely not be guided
by the more scientific international bodies such as COSPAR or the IAU, much as
their scientific efforts would seem to lead the way and indispensable as such efforts
might be. In view of the major political and social overtones of any game-changing
discovery of extra-terrestrial life, such a role would seem to fit more logically a
body representative not only of all relevant scientists of the world, but of all humans
of the world, which in view of the current structure of the international community
boils down to a body representative of all states of the world.
18.5 Mankind’s Embassy? The Role of the United Nations
In other words: this is where the United Nations would most likely be drawn, or
even invited into the game. Of course, also the United Nations has its inherent
limitations and handicaps in such a context. It should, for example, be realized at
the outset that it was originally established for reasons of political security,
essentially to help prevent something as atrocious as the Second World War and the
attendant crimes against humanity from ever recurring.26 This might not necessarily
make it a perfectly logical platform for scientific efforts to search for extra-terrestrial
(intelligent) life, especially as long as the actual discovery of intelligent life would
seem a remote (both in terms of time and in terms of chance) possibility.
On the other hand, already from the start ‘political security’ was interpreted
broadly, as encompassing economic, social and legal security, and as time passed
was relatively ‘easily’ further extended to medical, educational and even, nowa-
days, ecological realms of security. The United Nations consequently has served as
a platform for the establishment of treaties dealing with environmental pollution
and climate change, has established special agencies such as the FAO and
UNESCO to deal with hunger and education respectively, and has also at a political
level oftentimes allowed disputes to be solved or even pre-empted by peaceful
means rather than by resort to armed force. From this perspective, the intended role
for the United Nations indeed might well make sense: would not a realistic pos-
sibility of extra-terrestrial threats present the largest of all possible threats to
(political/human) security?
The present structure of the organization is ruled by the UN Charter, which in
the context of threats to international peace and security inter alia provides for the
right of self-defense and a duty of international cooperation to counter any such
threat.27 Thus, states are individually or with the help of their allies entitled to
defend themselves with force against an armed attack threatening their territorial
independence and integrity—at least for as long as the international community
26See Preamble, UN Charter.
27See Art. 51, also Art. 1, UN Charter.
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fails to take adequate measures to stop and roll back the attack and wipe out its
consequences as far as possible.28
At the same time, in spite of its near-global membership29 the limits of the role
of the United Nations have also become clear: oftentimes, when states undertook
actions in the international arena relying on the use of force which could not be
brought under the relatively narrow and well-circumscribed terms of the UN
Charter’s clause on self-defense, they choose to justify such use of force by ref-
erence to a—by definition—much more vaguely and generally broader right of
self-defense under customary international law. Inevitably, in many cases UN
involvement has been politicized, often meaning the objectively most correct or
desirable outcome would not be realized. Ultimately, it is the collective community
of states which determines the extent to which the United Nations can, and would,
actually take action in cases where, from an objective perspective, there could be
little doubt that international peace and security are under threat.
In this context of international security, the Charter also established the main two
organs of the United Nations and provides them with relevant competences.
The first organ is the General Assembly, representing states rather than mankind
or individual peoples; the General Assembly is not an ordinary democratic insti-
tution.30 Also this presents an important caveat to the desirability of UN involve-
ment in the context of extra-terrestrial life issues, in particular if such an
involvement would come to be exclusive. The key rule in this context is that of ‘one
state, one vote’; regardless of size of population or landmass, economic or military
power, or of political, economic and social system, all states are at least formally
speaking equal to each other. Furthermore, generally speaking the General
Assembly can not take binding decisions; its powers are limited to debating and
agreeing on Resolutions, which though politically important and equipped with the
inherent ability to reflect or turn into customary international law, as such are not
binding legal documents.31
This is in contrast with the second organ, the Security Council.32 Here, some states
turn out to be more equal than others, through the key role of the five permanent
members (the United States, the Russian Federation, China, the United Kingdom and
France) representing the reality of power politics at least at the end of the Second
28Art. 51, UN Charter, reads: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it
deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.”
29Currently, the United Nation counts 193 member states; see http://www.un.org/en/sections/
about-un/overview/index.html, http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml.
30See Arts. 9–22, UN Charter.
31Cf. Arts. 13–14, UN Charter.
32See Arts. 23–32, UN Charter.
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World War.33 As a consequence of this more ‘realistic’ dichotomy between the
then-major powers and the other states, the Security Council may take binding
decisions (in the limited area where it has to fulfill of its role, but this precisely
includes issues of international peace and security) which may even allow for or in
themselves include the use of force.34 The composition of the Council, however, in
particular the prerogatives of the five permanent members and their veto rights, is
increasingly under fire as no longer properly representing the current power balance
—such states as India, Japan, Germany and Brazil, and sometimes even the European
Union as such, occasionally claim to have equal rights to such a permanent seat.
Specifically with respect to its role in outer space, the United Nations has
established the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), as a
committee of the General Assembly, in 1958. Currently, it comprises 77 states,
more or less those most interested in outer space and space activities.35 As a
remnant from the Cold War, COPUOS works with consensus, down to determining
the official agenda, which effectively excludes dealing with threats to the peace.
More generally, in the context of COPUOS space law has developed firstly by
way of a handful of treaties in the late 60s and 70s, followed by UN Resolutions
providing guidelines for certain types of space activities. COPUOS operates
through two subcommittees, where—provided it would be accepted that the United
Nations should take a leading role in this context—the Scientific and Technical
Subcommittee may act as an embryonic international organization on space science
in the context of any activities relative to extra-terrestrial intelligence (primarily the
search therefore, so far), and the Legal Subcommittee might follow up with drafting
guidelines for those activities. Ultimately, such political or legal measures would
revert to the UN General Assembly for approval, after which they could be pro-
moted to a UN Resolution—or even to a draft treaty, open for signature and
ratification by individual states.
18.6 A Point of Reference for UN Action? The Case
of Near-Earth Objects
An interesting reference point for such an approach is presented by the case of
Near-Earth Objects (NEOs), which also present a kind of threat to earth from outer
space. Here, the international initiative came from the Association of Space
Explorers, a non-governmental private organization comprised by individuals
which drafted a report that has since been fed into the discussions in COPUOS.36
33See in particular Arts. 23(1), 27(3), UN Charter.
34Cf. Arts. 39–46, in particular Art. 42, UN Charter.
35See http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/members/index.html, http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/COP
UOS/copuos.html.
36See United Nations Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Fifty-third
session (9–18 June 2010), A/65/20, §§ 136–142.
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Amongst others, the proposals plan to use the General Assembly and Security
Council in specific new roles fine-tuned to the case of NEO threats, whilst leaving
the general structure intact.
Under these proposals, the General Assembly might essentially have a role in
mandating, on behalf of all states and indirectly of mankind, the Security Council to
coordinate (and undertake, as necessary) actions against NEO threats, in the process
‘waiving’ any liability for damage that might result as long as such actions take
place within the mandate.37 Such an approach thus recognizes the fact that only a
handful of states are actually capable of undertaking substantive action once a NEO
threat has been identified, and though the composition of the Security Council does
not necessarily or comprehensively equate with those states, the five permanent
members are certainly amongst the major space powers.
The precise relevance of the ongoing developments regarding NEO threat mit-
igation for the case of search for extra-terrestrial life, certainly if intelligent, may
have to be analysed in greater detail, but they certainly show that, at least in
principle, the United Nations could provide a roughly appropriate platform to use
also in that context. It is essentially the only readily available platform of almost
global scope, where member states have learned to some extent to cooperate
together for the perceived greater common good of mankind.
However, one key issue to be discussed in this context concerns whether the
division of competences between the General Assembly, as representative of all
(member) states, and the Security Council, as mandated to undertake certain tasks
requiring the consent at least of the five permanent members, would continue to
make sense. If for example action would need to be taken on an urgent basis with
respect to extra-terrestrial life, achieving consensus on how to act would be con-
siderably easier amongst the 15 states members of the Security Council as com-
pared to the 193 states members of the General Assembly. At the same time, its
acceptability may be lessened to the same extent.
A related key issue then concerns whether the distinction between the five current
permanentmembers of the Security Council as veto-holders and all other statesmakes
the same sense in the context of twenty-first century actions vis-à-vis (the possibility
of) extra-terrestrial life that it made in the context of the middle of the twentieth
century. The United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom and France have
rather varied capabilities in terms of the search for extra-terrestrial intelligence, and
from that perspective some other countries could lay equal or even better claims to
such capabilities—not to mention the intergovernmental ESA, harnessing the tech-
nological and scientific expertise of themost important spacefaring nations in Europe.
At the end of the day, however, it should again be realized that the United
Nations can only do what its member states generally speaking allow it to do.38
37See “Legal aspects of NEO threat response and related institutional issues”, University of
Nebraska-Lincoln, Final Report, 9 February 2010, § 4.
38The United Nations is, after all, still an intergovernmental, not a supranational organization of
sovereign member states.
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Even broadening interpretations of existing UN Charter concepts such as
‘self-defense’ and ‘threats to peace and security’, which would trigger certain legal
consequences in a semi-automatic manner, require at least silent consent or lack of
fundamental opposition from the more powerful states on earth, including the five
veto-wielding powers of the Security Council.
In conclusion, once the international peace or a threat to it may be at stake,
which at least covers one type of possible scenarios in the present context, the
United Nations would probably be the ‘least-worse’ platform. More substantial
questions would arise, however, once the discussion would extend to having the
organization deal with any contact with extra-terrestrial life. It may well be that the
United Nations is not yet ready for that, meaning that—for better or worse—
individual states remain completely at liberty to handle such scenarios in a political
and legal sense. One of those questions would concern whether the division of
states as between a Security Council always comprising—next to ten temporary
members—five permanent members with veto powers and the General Assembly
comprising all states of the world does make as much sense here as it, apparently,
does in the NEO context.
18.7 From Law to Meta-Law
It should be reiterated finally that the role of law is inherently limited to mankind.
Humans namely also generally understand the unspoken underlying assumptions
even if they do not always underwrite (all of) them. Extra-terrestrial life, obviously,
presuming of course it possesses the requisite intelligence in the first place, does not
necessarily share those assumptions, understandings or even the concept of ‘law’ as
a binding set of specific social arrangements amongst humans—nor does it need to
comply with it.
From this perspective, one should realize that there would be three generic sce-
narios at issue with respect to such extra-terrestrial life. Which of the three scenarios
turns out to be the proper one would also fundamentally determine which role the
United Nations, further to the above, would be likely to see thrust upon itself. The
higher the perceived degree of hostility towards and vulnerability of mankind vis-à-
vis any extra-terrestrial life would be, the more important it will be to address any
such perceived threats in as unified a version as possible, where the United Nations
again might then be seen as the ‘least-worse’ mechanism for achieving that.
Firstly, extra-terrestrial life might be fundamentally less intelligent and advanced
than human life, in which case it likely has no concept such as ‘law’. Should this
mean we humans could treat them as animals, as objects of the law with rights but
no self-standing capacity to stand up for them? Subject to certain decidedly
non-legal or meta-legal phenomena such as ethics or enlightened self-interest which
would likely intervene, this is at least probable to happen.
Secondly, extra-terrestrial life may be roughly as intelligent and advanced as
human life, in which case it is likely to have a concept similar to law, a construct of
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broad binding arrangements on behaviour and its consequences designed to facil-
itate interaction and the realization of something like ‘justice’—although it may be
elaborated very differently. In such scenarios probably humanity should strive for a
compromise ‘meta-law’, arranging essentially the respective spheres of application
of human-made law and the comparable extra-terrestrial system, as well as finding
some sort of common denominator, a compromise system or construct for
inter-species social and other interaction.39
Under this scenario, an overarching ‘regime’ would thus be supposed to deal
with the interaction between human life and extra-terrestrial intelligent life, by
somehow providing each with their own domain, and adding a superstructure of
meta-law. It would at least allow human life to continue applying the law amongst
itself in relative independence. One might consider an approach furthermore of
delineating the respective domains of application along ‘physical’/‘geographical’
lines: humanity the solar system, the extra-terrestrials their own part of the universe,
and in between ‘cosmic oceans’.
Furthermore, such ‘cosmic oceans’ would preferably be roughly comparable to
our terrestrial notion of ‘global commons’, essentially geographically delineated
areas which cannot be appropriated, hence ruled legally, by any individual state or
group of states and belong to society as a whole, whilst any individual state or
group of states is entitled to use those areas at liberty, as limited only by general
legal principles and laws.40 This also raises a warning sign, as the concept of a
‘commons’ has also given rise to the ‘tragedy of the commons’, where all are
entitled but no one (feels) responsible.
Thirdly, of course, extra-terrestrial life may be much more intelligent and
advanced—in which case humanity is in trouble, at least as far as its laws are
concerned. Whatever we might have concocted in terms of facilitating predictability
and correctness of behaviour, it will depend on such extra-terrestrial life whether
such a system and concept of ‘law’ will find any application vis-à-vis those
extra-terrestrials, or even amongst ourselves. Humanity may end up being the ‘ob-
ject’ of their system of ‘law’, or whatever has taken its place. This is essentially a
legal version of the famous ‘zoo hypothesis’—we are the intergalactic animals there,
only objects of the superior observations, interests and resulting socio-politico
constructs of superior creatures.
In sum, depending upon the level of intelligence and advancement of
extra-terrestrial life, the foundations of the law will suffice, be thoroughly shaken in
a need for a compromise, or found to be totally irrelevant in relation to such
extra-terrestrial life—and perhaps elsewhere, too…
39In a sense, this mirrors the current role of international public law respectively private inter-
national law as, inter alia, accommodating the various national law regimes wherever international
aspects or elements are involved, albeit at a conceptually higher level of course.
40Cf. for outer space Arts. II, I, Outer Space Treaty; and for the high seas Art. 87, United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, done 10 December 1982, entered into force 16
November 1994; 1833 UNTS 3 & 1835 UNTS 261; UKTS 1999 No. 81; Cmnd. 8941; ATS 1994
No. 31; 21 ILM 1261 (1982); S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-39.
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